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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Investment Company Act—Underwriters' Contracts—Annual Approval
of Shareholders.—Saminsky v. Abbott.'—Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc.
(Keystone), is the corporate trustee of Keystone Custodian Funds
(Funds). The Funds, ten common law trusts, are registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.2 Keystone Company of Boston (Key-
stone-Boston) is the principal underwriters of the Funds' shares.
In a derivative suit, plaintiffs, shareholders in the Funds, alleged Key-
stone had exacted excessive management and expense fees, and that the
underwriting contract of the Funds with Keystone-Boston was void for
failure to submit the contract to annual shareholder approval. The defend-
ants, the investment company, its directors, and wholly owned underwriter,
on a motion for summary judgment, contended that the plaintiffs were
estopped from alleging excessive fees because they agreed to them when
they purchased shares in the Funds, and that the underwriters' contract
was not void because it had been rewritten within two year periods, thereby
rendering Section 15 (b) (1) of the Investment Company Act' inapplicable.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to excessive management
and expense fees, and the validity of the underwriters' contract was denied . 5
HELD: 1. Equitable review of Keystone's management and expense fees was
warranted where the fees had reached such exorbitance as to amount to
gifts of corporate assets: 6 2. The underwriters' contract was void because
the contract continued in effect without the required annual shareholder
approval of section 15(b) (1). Rewriting the contract within two years by
changing the amounts of underwriters' compensation was not sufficient to
render the act inapplicable. The act intended to give the shareholders
control over the practices of the principal underwriter; merely rewriting
the compensation agreement would subvert congressional intent.
Shareholders in investment companies have recently instigated numerous
federal and state court actions to protect their interests.? In Brown v.
Bullock,8 the court was satisfied that the Investment Company Act was an
indication of congressional intent to create a body of federal law which would
protect shareholders in investment companies. The shareholders' complaint
was there held to state a federal cause of action, if the director gave only
1 Sept. 18, 1961, Del. Ch. Ct.
2 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-52 (1958).
$ "Principal underwriter" is the wholesale distributor of the Funds' shares. Lobell,
The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 182 n. 5 (1961): "The
principal underwriter who operates under a contract with the fund, bears the entire
cost of literature, statistical presentations and other sales aids provided to investment
retailers." The principal underwriters' compensation is derived from the sales load.
"Sales charges of 8% to 8%% are common. Six % or more may be paid to the
retail distributor or principal underwriter."
4 Investment Company Act 1940, § 15(b)(1), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-15(b) (1) (1958).
5 Defendants' motion for summary judgment, over plaintiffs' contention that Key-
stone was acting as investment advisor to the Funds in violation of the Investment
Company Act, was granted.
6 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 528, 591 (1933).
7 There are about sixty derivative suits pending in federal and state courts as of
October, 1961.
194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
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token annual approval of the underwriters' and advisors' contract, and if
the management fees were excessive as alleged.° Under section 44, 10 state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of violations of the act. The Delaware
Chancery Court is here developing a body of law which will protect share-
holders in a state forum.
Equitable intervention may be warranted as the plaintiffs allege, but
proof of these allegations is not without difficulty. Plaintiff shareholders
in Meiselman v. Eberstadel failed to adduce proof other than the rates of
compensation to directors and officers who were shareholders in the advisory
company. The plaintiffs claimed that the compensation was excessive. The
court assumed that plaintiffs were not alleging the advisory fees to be
excessive and dismissed the action, concluding it could not hold the compen-
sation excessive merely because the defendants had received amounts some-
what in excess of the averages received in the industry.
Shareholders have been successful in recovering management fees when
they could point to a violation of the Investment Company Act. 12 The
court in Meiselman had before it compensation payments without an alle-
gation of a violation of the act. With only industrial averages for compar-
ison, the court failed to find excessiveness. In the instant case, the same
court is asked again to find fees excessive, not based on a violation of the
act, but rather on a violation of the equity doctrine of Rogers v. Hill. Plain-
tiffs have sought discovery proceedings.13 This may produce evidence on
the excessive fee issue which an equity court should require, and thus save
the plaintiffs from the result of Meiselman. A review of fees charged by an
investment company cannot be carried out in a vacuum. Keystone fees
alone lead to no conclusion.14 A court may be best aided in its review if
the fees of comparable investment companies are used as standards, rather
than an average of fees charged in an industry. This would have the ad-
0
 Supra note 8, at 237.
10 Investment Company Act § 44, 54 Stat. 844 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-43 (1958): "The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of
violations of this title . . concurrently with state and territorial courts of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by . . . this
title."
11 170 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1961).
12 See Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1961). A cause of action for
illegal management fees was successful when plaintiffs could show that the fees were
paid under an illegal, void advisors' contract.
13 Letter from William E. Haudek, counsel for plaintiff, to the B. C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev., Nov. 20, 1961: ".. . By order of October 13, 1961, the Chancellor granted . .
plaintiffs leave to submit additional opposing papers, and if plaintiffs are so advised
. . . to apply for permission to conduct discovery proceedings. . . . We, as plaintiffs,
are in the process of moving for leave to take discovery proceedings."
14 Keystone is compensated according to a rate set forth in the trust agreements:
Section 3. A recurring charge ... at the rate of A of 1% per annum of the market
value of the Fund. This deduction is to be made in lieu of all expenses of operation of
the Fund except the management fee . . Section 4. A management fee shall be
computed and deducted from the principal of the Fund at the rate of Y2 of 1% per
annum of the market value of the Fund.
The management fee ... shall be reduced to ; ,g of 1% per annum on that portion
of the combined total market value of all Keystone Custodian Funds in excess of $150,-
000,000.
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vantage of comparing the size of the fund, the composition of the portfolio,
the investment objective, the fund performance, and the number of per-
sonnel employed. These factors determine the services rendered a fund by
its advisors." The fees should be related to the services rendered. A court
presented with this evidence would have a sound basis for a determination
of excessiveness.
The court, in holding the underwriters' contract void for lack of share-
holder approval, looked at the wording of section 15(b) (1),
[The underwriter contract] shall continue in effect for a period more
than two years from the date of its execution only so long as such
continuance is specifically approved at least annually by the board
of directors or by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting
securities of such company. (Emphasis added.)
and interpreted the "continue in effect" phrase to relate to the continuing
relationship of the underwriters to the Funds, rather than relating to minor
contract changes. Defendants contended that the contract was rewritten
and changed within two years, thereby conforming with the requirements
of the act and not requiring shareholder approval. The court dismissed these
contentions with the conclusion that the compensation charges were in-
significant, and, since the Funds had no board of directors, the contract
required shareholder approval. The court expressed no opinion as to the
effect of substantial compensative changes. If substantial changes were
held to be required, this would still leave Keystone in a dilemma as to what
is substantial.
The court's reasoning was that the relationship between a fund and
its principal underwriter may be detrimental to the shareholders'° because
of the practices of the underwriter.'" This relationship, the court finds by
a review of legislative history, is the object of congressional control. A
logical extension of their reasoning would lead to the conclusion that no
change in the contract could alter the relationship between Keystone and
Keystone-Boston. The terms of a contract would not alter the relationship
of a corporation with its wholly owned subsidiary.
Shareholder approval would legally give the control of the relationship
to the investor. Obtaining annual shareholder approval should present no
obstacle to the management in control of the proxy machinery." The
15
 Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 182 n. 4,
192 (1961).
18 See Hearing on S. 3580 Before a Senate Subcommittee on Banking and Currency.
76th Cong., 3d. Sess., pt. 1, at 135-45 (1940).
17
 Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 208 (1961):
As a whole, the pattern reflects a concern with the fact that any increase in the
size of the funds' assets, whether it comes about by sales of shares or by in-
creasing the value of outstanding shares through good investment performance,
results in an increase of fee income computed as a percentage of assets.
18
 13allantine, Corporations 180, 412 (2d ed. 1946) : "In practice, therefore, proxy
voting has operated to enable the management in office to perpetuate itself and control
the corporation." Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 245
(1933): "Legally the proxy is an agent for the shareholder. Factually, he is a dummy
for the management, and is expected to do as he is told." Lattin, Corporations 306
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comparative ease with which management obtains approval of its proposals
should afford a practical means to "continue in effect" this relationship
while still complying with the court's interpretation of the statute.
GEORGE T. LENEHAN
Labor Law—Federal Pre-Emption Doctrine—Criminal Trespass.—
People v. Goduto. 1—The defendants, non-employee union organizers, en-
tered upon a parking lot, leased by Sears, Roebuck and Company adjacent
to one of their Chicago stores, for the purpose of distributing union leaf-
lets and questionnaires to the store's employees. The operating superintend-
ent asked them to leave several times, but each time they refused. The
superintendent then called the police, who arrested the defendants and
charged them with a violation of Illinois' criminal trespass statute. 2 After
being convicted in the Chicago Municipal Court, they appealed on the
ground, inter alia, that Illinois had no jurisdiction because of federal pre-
emption of labor disputes. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. HELD:
"1T]he maintenance of domestic peace and the absence of any preventive
relief for the protection of the employer's property rights is of sufficient
importance to give Ithe state] . . . jurisdiction to enforce the criminal
trespass statute . ." 3 And although it is arguable that the defendants'
conduct was protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 4
and notwithstanding the fact that a state has no jurisdiction to determine
the validity of this defense, nevertheless, because of the defendants' fail-
ure to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the
state could assume jurisdiction of the crime charged.5
The expansion of the federal government into areas once the private
domain of the states has been a continuing cause of jurisdictional conflict.
A frequent battleground is labor-management relations. Following the
enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935, 6 a series of cases in the United
(1959): "While it (proxy voting) is a useful device to get things done, it is also a
device which favors management in its operation, more than the corporation shareholder."
1 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961), cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. Week 3179 (U.S.
Dec. 5, 1961).
2 Whoever ... is unlawfully upon the enclosed or unenclosed land of another
and is notified to depart therefrom by the owner, or occupant, or by his agent
or servant, and neglects or refuses so to do, . . . shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. . . .
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 565 (1957).
3 174 N.E.2d at 388.
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
6 Contra, Freeman v. Local 1207, Retail Clerks, 363 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1961);
State v. Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. § 65,708 (Md. Crim. Ct., Baltimore City, 1959).
The defendants also contended that, under Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
their right to disseminate information was protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The court distinguished the Marsh case by
limiting it to its facts and held that the defendants' conduct was not constitutionally
protected. On this point there is contrary authority. See People v. Maio, 38 CCH Lab.
Cas. 9 68,835 (111. Cir. Ct. 1959) ; State v. Williams, supra.
6 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1958).
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